2. Inferences

In the light of the preceding discussion, we may properly estimate the elements of truth and of error in the common definition of sin as ‘the voluntary transgression of known law.’

(a) Not all sin is voluntary as being a distinct and conscious volition; for evil disposition and state often precede and occasion evil volition, and evil disposition and state are themselves sin. All sin, however, is voluntary as springing either directly from will, or indirectly from those perverse affections and desires which have themselves originated in will. ‘Voluntary’ is a term broader than ‘volitional,’ and includes all those permanent states of intellect and affection which the will has made what they are. Will, moreover, is not to be regarded as simply the faculty of volitions, but as primarily the underlying determination of the being to a supreme end.

Will, as we have seen, includes preference (θέλημα, voluntas, Wille) as well as volition (βουλή, arbitrium, Willkür). We do not, with Edwards and Hodge, regard the sensibilities as states of the will. They are, however, in their character and their objects determined by the will, and so they may be called voluntary. The permanent state of the will (New School “elective preference”) is to be distinguished from the permanent state of the sensibilities (dispositions, or desires). But both are voluntary because both are due to past decisions of the will, and “whatever springs from will we are responsible for” (Shedd, Discourses and Essays, 243). Julius Müller, 2:51—“We speak of self-consciousness and reason as something which the ego has but we identify the will with the ego. No one would say, ‘my will has decided this or that,’ although we do say, ‘my reason, my conscience teaches me this or that.’ The will is the very man himself, as Augustine says: ‘Voluntas est in omnibus; imo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt.’ ”

For other statements of the relation of disposition to will, see Alexander, Moral Science, 151—“In regard to dispositions, we say that they are in a sense voluntary. They properly belong to the will, taking the word in a large sense. In judging of the morality of voluntary acts, the principle from which they proceed is always included in our view and comes in for a large part of the blame”; see also pages 201, 207, 208. Edwards on the Affections, 3:1–22; on the Will, 3:4—“The affections are only certain modes of the exercise of the will.” A. A. Hodge, Outlines of Theology, 234—“All sin is voluntary, in the sense that all sin has its root in the perverted dispositions, desires, and affections which constitute the depraved state of the will.” But to Alexander, Edwards, and Hodge, we reply that the first sin was not voluntary in this sense, for there was no such depraved state of the will from which it could spring. We are responsible for dispositions, not upon the ground that they are a part of the will, but upon the ground that they are effects of will, in other words, that past decisions of the will have made them what they are. See pages 504–513.

(b) Deliberate intention to sin is an aggravation of transgression, but it is not essential to constitute any given act or feeling a sin. Those evil inclinations and. impulses which rise unbidden and master the soul before it is well aware of their nature, are themselves violations of the divine law, and indications of an inward, depravity which in the case of each descendant of Adam is the chief and fontal transgression.

Joseph Cook: “Only the surface-water of the sea is penetrated with light. Beneath is a half-lit region. Still further down is absolute darkness. We are greater than we know.” Weismann, Heredity, 2:8—“At the depth of 170 meters, or 552 feet, there is about as much light as that of a starlight night when there is no moon. Light penetrates as far as 400 meters, or 1,300 feet, but animal life exists at a depth of 4,000 meters, or 13,000 feet. Below 1,300 feet, all animals are blind.” Cf. Ps. 51:6; 19:12—“the inward parts … the hidden parts.… hidden faults”—hidden not only from others, but even from ourselves. The light of consciousness plays only on the surface of the waters of man’s soul.

(c) Knowledge of the sinfulness of an act or feeling is also an aggravation of transgression, but it is not essential to constitute it a sin. Moral blindness is the effect of transgression, and, as inseparable from corrupt affections and desires, is itself condemned by the divine law.

It is our duty to do better than we know. Our duty of knowing is as real as our duty of doing. Sin is an opiate. Some of the most deadly diseases do not reveal themselves in the patient’s countenance, nor has the patient any adequate understanding of his malady. There is an ignorance which is indolence. Men are often unwilling to take the trouble of rectifying their standards of judgment. There is also an ignorance which is intention. Instance many students’ ignorance of College laws.

We cannot excuse disobedience by saying: “I forgot.” God’s commandment is “Remember”—as in Ex. 20:8; cf. 2 Pet. 3:5—“For this they wilfully forget.” “Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.” Rom. 2:12—“as many as have sinned without the law shall also perish without the law”: Luke 12:48—“he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten [though] with few stripes.” The aim of revelation and of preaching is to bring man “to himself” (cf. Luke 15:17)—to show him what he has been doing and what he is. Goethe: “We are never deceived: we deceive ourselves.” Royce, World and Individual, 2:359—“The sole possible free moral action is then a freedom that relates to the present fixing of attention upon the ideas of the Ought which are already present. To sin is consciously to choose to forget, through a narrowing of the field of attention, an Ought that one already recognizes.”

(d) Ability to fulfill the law is not essential to constitute the non-fulfilment sin. Inability to fulfill the law is a result of transgression, and, as consisting not in an original deficiency of faculty but in a settled state of the affections and will, it is itself condemnable. Since the law presents the holiness of God as the only standard for the creature, ability to obey can never be the measure of obligation or the test of sin.

Not power to the contrary, in the sense of ability to change all our permanent states by mere volition, is the basis of obligation and responsibility; for surely Satan’s responsibility does not depend upon his power at any moment to turn to God and be holy.

Definitions of sin—Melanchthon: Defectus vel inclinatio vel actio pugnans cute loge Dei. Calvin: Illegalitas, seu difformitas a lege. Hollaz: Aberratio a lege divina. Hollaz adds: “Voluntariness does not enter into the definition of sin, generically considered. Sin may be called voluntary, either in respect to its cause, as it inheres in the will, or in respect to the act, as it procedes from deliberate volition. Here is the antithesis to the Roman Catholics and to the Socinians, the latter of whom define sin as a voluntary [i. e., a volitional] transgression of law”—a view, says Hase (Hutterus Redivivus, 11th ed., 162–164), “which is derived from the necessary methods of civil tribunals, and which is incompatible with the orthodox doctrine of original sin.”

On the New School definition of sin, see Fairchild, Nature of Sin, in Bib. Sac., 25:30–48; Whedon, in Bib. Sac., 19:251, and On the Will, 328. Per contra, see Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2:180–190; Lawrence, Old School in N. E. Theol., in Bib. Sac., 20:317–328; Julius Müller, Doc. Sin, 1:40–72; Nitzsch, Christ. Doct., 216; Luthardt, Compendium der Dogmatik, 124–126.